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Abstract
In earlier works, the author has twice discussed 
Wittgenstein’s work in relation to the modernist 
Geist that prevailed during his time. In the first, 
it was argued that the Tractatus was a modernist 
cornerstone, and then the idea was advanced that 
Wittgenstein’s later thought exemplified an es-
sential modernist trait. Without contradicting 
these claims, a criticism is now offered on the 
aestheticism crucial to modernism and also to 
Wittgenstein’s thought. 
Resumen
En el pasado, dos veces trabajé discutiendo sobre 
el trabajo de Wittgenstein en relación con el Geist 
que prevalecía en su época. Argüí, primero, que 
el Tractatus era una piedra angular y entonces 
continué la idea de que el último pensamiento 
de Wittgenstein ejemplificaba un esencial trata-
do modernista. Sin contradecir estos propósitos, 
ofrezco ahora una visión crítica del esteticismo 
crucial para el Modernismo y también para el 
pensamiento de Wittgenstein.
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An autobiographical introduction
Both modernism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy are topics to which I find myself incessantly 
returning: consuming, thinking and reading about modernist art – modernist literature, 
theatre, visual arts, architecture and music; trying to understand (but also struggle with) the 
modernist charm, its historical uniqueness and enigmatic power; and reading Wittgenstein 
(and about him), thinking – or training myself to think – along his lines of thought, resisting 
him. Wittgenstein’s main oeuvre was written in Europe during the heyday of Modernism, 
and it is quite clear that he was aware of the uniqueness of the historical moment he was 
active in. His numerous remarks about contemporary art, music and literature, as well as his 
political insights, certainly attest to this. In the past, I have twice discussed Wittgenstein’s 
work in relation to the modernist Geist that prevailed during his time. My first attempt was an 
elaborate argument, which aimed both at uncovering a deeply entrenched modernist dogma 
and at presenting Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as the clearest expression of modernist philosophy 
(including that dogma, of course). This argument is the core of my book, Modernism and the 
Language of Philosophy. But as I kept reflecting on the Wittgenstein-modernism issue, I came 
to embrace a different approach. A volume of essays I had the privilege to edit, entitled Un-
derstanding Wittgenstein, Understanding Modernism, offered many perspectives from which 
the Wittgenstein-modernism linkage was addressed. Through my involved reading of these 
essays, I came to realize that no clear-cut and definitive analysis could capture that linkage, 
and that its lack was essential, because both Wittgenstein’s oeuvre and modernist artworks 
show us that in order to gain understanding we need hesitation, instability, doubts, a variety 
of attempts at articulation and the refusal of tempting (positive or negative) solutions. Ap-
proaching the question about Wittgenstein’s relation to modernism in this vein emphasizes 
the Later Wittgenstein, rather than the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and of-
fers a softer, more «feminine» line of interpretation to the modernist legacy, which is usually 
thought of as rather «masculine». These terms, «feminine» and «masculine», are not drawn 
from either the Wittgensteinian or the modernist core-glossary. They gain their importance 
and explanatory force from a post-modernist perspective. Indeed, the post-modernist view-
Anat Matar Monográfico
Revista de historiografía 32, 2019, pp.53-70
56
point has helped me in my analyses throughout my years of reading and loving Wittgenstein 
and modernism; but in the present, third encounter, I’d particularly like to appeal to some 
post-modernist insights in order to criticize a notion appealed to by Wittgenstein and the 
modernist artists and thinkers alike: that of aesthetic sensitivity. My talk will hence consist 
of necessarily elaborate presentations of my first two encounters with the Wittgenstein-mod-
ernism linkage, and then an inconclusive postmodernist musing. 
First Encounter 
By «modernism» I refer loosely to a movement which united artists, writers and literary cri-
tics who worked, roughly, since the end of the 19th Century until the outbreak of the second 
world war. Notoriously, one of its agreed characterizations is that it defies characterization. 
But it is quite common to theorists of modernism to identify it by its incessant examination 
and destabilization of the medium of expression («form») and its role in effecting content. 
Read thus, as essentially dialectical, self-reflective and self-critical, modernism is philosophi-
cal to the core. Yet one of the fundamental ideas adhered to by modernists is the claim that 
their own works should not be classified as philosophical, but rather be seen as the proper 
heir of traditional philosophy, because the kind of truth sub specie aeterni sought by philo-
sophers cannot be straightforwardly articulated and hence is better expressed by the arts. In 
their attempts at articulating this truth, philosophers allegedly use an improper linguistic 
tool, and as a result they are left devoid of tongue, speechless.
It is crucial to see that the modernist conception of language which left traditional 
philosophy mute was distrustful towards everyday language as well. A quick mention of Joyce, 
Beckett, Woolf, Mallarmé, Rilke and also – and significantly – Benjamin reminds us that this 
is so. Ordinary language, being informational and instrumental in essence, was conceived 
by modernists as essentially stale and irrelevant for anything real. Indeed, for this reason 
realism itself was rejected as fraudulent. Thus Clement Greenberg writes that for modernists, 
realistic art was taken as illusionist, as one which had dissembled the medium, using art to 
conceal art.1 Michael Bell, writing on the metaphysics of modernism, goes even further and 
emphasizes the modernist resistance to concepts as such: conceptual and theoretical analyses, 
he argues, were not seen by modernists as able to convey the kind of multifaceted truth they 
sought.2 Following Nietzsche, any part of language that was conceived a mere passive repres-
entation was looked at as unreflective and inadequate for expressing the real richness of ex-
perience. Images (including literary images, metaphors) were found much more suitable for 
this purpose. A similar idea is expressed by Fredric Jameson, when he argues that with mod-
1. C. Greenberg, (1965) “Modernist Painting”, reprinted in F. Frascina, F. and Ch. Harrison, Ch., Modern 
Art and Modernism – A Critical Anthology, London, Paul Chapman Publishing, 1982, 6.
2. M. Bell, “The Metaphysics of Modernism”, in M. Levenson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Moder-
nism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 10.
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ernism we see a movement «away from positive content, and from the various dogmatisms 
of the signifier», towards an acknowledgement of «the gap between signifier and signified».3 
While putting in doubt the ability of language to perform its traditional role of repres-
enting a firm reality, modernists emphasized its enormous capacities for creating. And they 
tried to express, to «perform», show, present, what both ordinary language and the language 
of philosophy had failed to represent. Their reflections were therefore expressed in artistic 
practice, in a spontaneous and subliminal way. The language of literature, or poetry – artistic 
language – is a language that is conscious of the true nature of language, they thought, and 
artists are the only ones who, in their extraordinary combinations of forms and words, suc-
ceed in touching the real. Thus modernists did not only understand how tightly content 
and form were interwoven; they saw how non-neutral was technique, or medium, and hence 
were aware of the connection between their new attention to and re-evaluation of form (or 
technique) and the need to rethink the nature of the different registers of language and their 
relations to man and world.
All these post-modern (rather than post-modernist) themes adhere to a sharp distinc-
tion between the language of empirical discourse (including both ordinary and scientific 
discourses) and any linguistic form that expresses the creative, world-shaping dimensions of 
language. As for philosophy, contrary to certain trends in the 19th century, which drew philo-
sophical investigations closer to those of psychology, history, or the natural sciences, mod-
ernists took it to be a sui generis. A logical or ethical reflection had to be independent of other 
intellectual disciplines. But it is precisely this purist requirement of autonomy that eventually 
forced philosophy into a non-existent territory and its sentences were presented as a sham.
This modernist picture of real and imagined linguistic territories is of course perfectly 
depicted in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. The book was published almost simultaneously with 
Joyce’s Ulysses, T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, Katherine Mansfield’s The Garden Party and 
Woolf ’s Jacob’s Room. As I read it, the book presents a definitive analysis of the Cartesian-Kan-
tian-Fregean vision of man’s place in the world and the possibilities and limits of reflecting 
about it. The Tractatus is modernist because it maximally crystallises and expresses modern 
thought (i.e., «traditional philosophy»), and by doing just this – annuls it. It develops the 
Frege-Russell notation as a manifestation of the Western tradition’s requirements of world 
and thought: a realist metaphysics (remember that «solipsism strictly carried out coincides 
with pure realism»); a logocentric view of thought; and a conception of language as necessar-
ily based on representation. These are the three prerequisites for any conceivable philosophy, 
and they are intimately connected.
The Tractarian draughtsman – as the epitome of traditional philosophy – is required to 
delineate the limits of thought and of language, and for this he needs to have a stable picture 
of the world: «If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would de-
pend on whether another proposition was true. In that case we could not sketch any picture 
of the world (true or false)» (T 2.0211, 2.0212). The world has to have substance, and objects 
3. F., Jameson, The Prison House of Language, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972, 195.
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must make up this subsistent, unalterable substance. Language reflects this stable metaphys-
ical picture. Indeed, despite the few mentions of the intricacy and livelihood of everyday lan-
guage (4.002, 5.5563), the language conceived of in the Tractatus is altogether straightjack-
eted. Since the sense of a proposition cannot depend on whether another proposition was 
true, «to have meaning means to be true or false: the being true or false actually constitutes 
the relation of the proposition to reality, which we mean by saying that it has meaning (Sinn)» 
(NB 113). Thus, the metaphysical requirements we pose to «reality» dictate also our account 
of language, and then we project them back from language onto reality. «A proposition must 
restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no. In order to do that, it must describe reality com-
pletely» (T 4.023). The interconnected requirements of complete description and bivalence 
affect, in turn, the structure of the proposition. A genuine proposition has to be «logical», 
uncontaminated by vagueness, evasive meaning or subjective interpretations. It must be ana-
lysable into simple components. Thus realism and representationalism are one and the same, 
reflecting the requirements of traditional logico-philosophical discourse.
But here comes the sting. As we learned from Nietzsche, especially in his early «On 
Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense», throughout Western philosophy, it is language that in-
troduces God – the transcendent stabiliser – in order to secure truth, and eventually itself in 
return. For language acquires its own stability from the stipulated correspondence to the stable 
reality it fathoms. And so it is in the Tractatus as well. The assumed isomorphism between 
language and reality, the bivalence of propositions, the metaphysics of simple objects, all 
depend on a matching «external» I, a metaphysical subject, that is, however, nowhere to be 
found (5.633). Realism and representationalism turn out to be justified only at the cost of 
establishing them on what they exclude. Hence the tension in reading the Tractatus. It at the 
same time affirms «and» denies realism, logocentrism and representationalism.
Thus, philosophical discourse completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which 
it has always been intended. It is for this reason that the famous distinction between saying 
and showing is so crucial. This, more than any other traditional distinction, gives modern-
ism its raison d’être – or better, its mode d’emploi, its mode of action. Frege’s attention to the 
necessary distance between language and world, sign and object, established the representa-
tional function of language by alienating, for the first time, the representing subject from the 
represented object. Since Frege, Logos excludes immediacy: neither subject nor object could 
«speak for itself», present itself, in the logical-linguistic realm. What needs to be captured 
immediately cannot be captured by any proposition in language, a proposition with sense 
and reference. Rather, it «shows itself» in the very «action» of people using language. It is 
hence ergos, rather than logos, that is the proper medium for reflection sub specie aeterni, for 
reaching the origin sought by philosophers. Read in this way, the say/show distinction is but 
another catchword for the old logos/ergos one, the word/deed distinction. And «in the be-
ginning was the deed». Philosophy, in its logical, conceptual aspirations, is found inherently 
inadequate to accomplish the job it took upon itself, since words-cum-representations cannot 
overcome the distance from their references. Showing, presenting, performing, acting – these 
are the ways to overcome it. From this the distance is short for concluding that it is art, not 
philosophy, which eradicates the necessary abyss immanent to the representational medium.
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Thus, the Tractarian decisiveness about the act of cancellation, the finality and purity 
of its results, the definitive silence, are strongly anchored in the fundamental assumptions re-
garding the principles that are implicitly embedded in every station of Western thought, and 
the total collapse of philosophical language in the Tractatus is conditioned upon accepting 
these principles. Whether Wittgenstein embraced them and took the picture he drew to be 
true but unsayable (as «orthodox» interpreters read him), or wished to expose their barren 
nonsensicality (as so-called «therapeutes» do), he certainly believed that his Tractatus caught 
the essence of philosophy and of language «as traditionally conceived». It is therefore not a 
coincidence that the say/show distinction is the one traditional distinction that «therapeutic» 
interpreters of Wittgenstein are not happy to treat as nonsensical. Whether Wittgenstein 
«seriously» showed us the inexpressible logical structure of the world, or, alternatively, only 
«ironically» pointed at the futility of this notion, philosophy’s impotence is certain and final, 
and it «seriously» lays a heavy burden on showing, acting, presenting. This is how we get the 
core of modernism.
Before I move on to my second station, it is important to linger on just a little bit on 
the philosophical practice of the modernist artists themselves. Formally, as Greenberg pro-
claims, «modernist art does not offer theoretical demonstrations. It could be said, rather, that 
it converts all theoretical possibilities into empirical ones…» Its philosophical position «has 
been altogether a question of practice, immanent to practice and never a topic of theory».4 
I’ve just explained the reason for this. Yet many modernists felt that it was not at all easy to 
come to terms with the burden of theoretical silence, especially since their art was essentially 
philosophical through and through. As a result, we find in the work of some modernist artists 
an equivalent to Wittgenstein’s puzzling ladder: a use of words which eo ipso annul them-
selves. Thus we have a series of modernist manifestos – futurist, surrealist, imagist, etc. – and 
reflective essays, like those written by D.H. Lawrence and Bertolt Brecht, complementing the 
artistic deeds with somewhat anti-theoretical theoretical reflections. Alternatively, the mod-
ernist ladder manifested itself in the suspicion artists directed towards their own artworks 
and a doubt concerning their ability to use them for expressing what they wished. Rilke sup-
plies us with a fine example, for the steps in «Die Treppe der Orangerie – Versailles» (1906!) 
lead nowhere, or towards an inexpressible outside, precisely like the famous Tractarian lad-
der: «Even so this flight of steps ascends in lonely / pomp between pillars bowing eternally: 
/ slowly and By the Grace of God and only / to Heaven and nowhere intermittently;». In the 
later works of Mallarmé, as Hans-Jost Frey shows, «the poem as something that comes into 
being is completely incompatible with what it expresses. If what it expresses were actually 
true, then it could not have come into being. In this way, everything that is expressed is ques-
tioned by the fact that it is expressed, just as, on the contrary, the positivity of expression is 
itself questioned by what is expressed. The ontological status of the poem… constitutes itself 
as its own annulment’.5
4. C. Greenberg, “Modernist...”, op. cit., 9.
5. Frey 1996, 58.
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Second Encounter – Plurality and Aesthetic Sensitivity
This tension concerning the need to articulate what cannot be articulated uncovered what I 
believed to be – in my first encounter with the Wittgenstein-modernism linkage – a moder-
nist dogma: despite their radicalism, modernist thinkers and artists clang to the traditional 
belief that the logocentric assumptions of philosophy are essential to it: that any philosophical 
attempt must yield to a saturated, static, «logical» conception of concepts, a stable reality and 
its definite representation. In this they virtually concurred with the academic classification 
of the writings of Hamann and Nietzsche, for example, as literary rather than philosophical. 
From a post-Tractarian perspective, it is evident that the Tractatus did «not» reach an «unas-
sailable and definitive» truth; it did not annihilate philosophical language. And that is prima-
rily because the metaphysical-methodological dogma concerning the nature of philosophy 
– which it took for granted – is false. Indeed, Wittgenstein was the first to acknowledge that. 
In G.E. Moore’s recollections from his conversations with Wittgenstein, the latter is quoted 
as calling what he was doing «philosophy», yet «saying that it was not the same kind of thing 
as Plato or Berkeley had done, but that we may feel that what he was doing ‘takes the place’ of 
what Plato and Berkeley did» (PO 96). His was a «new subject», in which the finality is gone, 
and the limit-drawing Tractarian draughtsman with the confident hand and sharp logic is 
replaced by a «weak draughtsman», that all he can produce is a series of [grammatical] sket-
ches, sometimes «badly drawn». I am of course quoting here Wittgenstein’s own metaphors 
in the Preface to Philosophical Investigations. Explicitly acknowledging his former philosophy 
as dogmatic, he understood that instead of requiring that as a philosopher he should occupy 
a nonexistent place, and hence disappear, he should rather be everywhere, in constant move, 
changing locations and postures: «A thinker is very much like a draughtsman whose aim is to 
represent all the interrelations between things» (CV 12e), he remarked in 1931 – a formative 
period of his later thought. With the change from ethereal logic to earthly grammar a new 
philosophical époque was opened.
Does this change mean that the later Wittgenstein deserted his early modernism? I 
used to believe that it does; that Wittgenstein’s acknowledgement of his former dogma led 
him out of the modernist stage. I no longer believe that this is so. Rather, I now think that his 
philosophy developed into a more mature and subtle form of modernism, one that does not 
break off at the «failure» of representation but emphasizes the «creativity» of the linguistic 
medium as a philosophical tenet. Thus, form and content are interwoven in Wittgenstein’s 
later writings in a totally different way from that of the Tractatus. Language is no longer 
modelled upon a previously tailored notion of abstract, logical «thought» which digs its own 
grave: it is stripped off its traditional role of neutrally representing a firm reality, prior to and 
independent of the linguistic means of its expression. When we read Wittgenstein’s later re-
marks – and here it is crucial to read beyond the Investigations – we see the idea of «entrench-
ing philosophy more firmly in its own language» getting its purest expression. Even a passing 
remark such as «Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if it is read at the right tempo. 
My sentences are all supposed to be read slowly» (CV 57, 1947) reveals a new and radical 
kind of interest in language, very different from the earlier version. But such an interest in the 
«materiality» of language, needless to say, is thoroughly modernist.
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So, the focus on the topic of modernism still seems to me useful for noticing less fa-
miliar aspects of Wittgenstein’s interest in language. In that volume on Wittgenstein and 
modernism, Garry Hagberg compares Wittgenstein’s interest in language as being written 
and read to that of Henry James, emphasizing Wittgenstein’s self-consciousness about the 
possibilities of small linguistic errors that quickly grow into large philosophical ones, and of 
the impulses to miscast what we know and what we would say in the interest of a formerly-
laid-down theory. In a different vein, David Schalkwyk’s interest in modernism makes him 
read Wittgenstein’s later writing as revealing immanent inner tensions between the situated-
ness of the philosophical search for meaning and the uncanniness of language as home. Both 
these suggestions (and others in that volume, e.g. those of Élise Marrou and David MacAr-
thur) make it absolutely clear that Wittgenstein’s later conceptions of language, of aesthetics 
and of philosophy combine the basis on which everything else is built.6 
In what way? It is certainly not accidental that what we need here are Wittgenstein’s 
own words rather than a paraphrase. Let me start by quoting one of Wittgenstein’s most 
famous remarks, written in 1933-4: «I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when 
I said: philosophy ought really to be written as a form of poetic composition… I was thereby 
revealing myself as someone who cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do (CV 
24). This quote is crucial for understanding what it was, in Wittgenstein’s unique approach to 
language, which could reveal unnoticed tensions and lead to a novel attitude towards them. 
Consider the following paragraph from The Blue and Brown Books:
What we call ‘understanding a sentence’ has, in many cases, a much greater similarity to unders-
tanding a musical theme than we might be inclined to think. But I don’t mean that understan-
ding a musical theme is more like the picture which one tends to make oneself of understanding 
a sentence; but rather that this picture is wrong, and that understanding a sentence is much 
more like what really happens when we understand a tune than at first sight appears. For un-
derstanding a sentence, we say, points to a reality outside the sentence. Whereas one might say 
‘Understanding a sentence means getting hold of its content; and the content of the sentence is 
in the sentence’. (BB 167, § 17)
This insight on understanding sentences through an internal gaze, which strengthens 
the linkage between content and form in language, is further developed and exemplified in 
Philosophical Investigations:
Understanding a sentence in language is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than 
one may think. What I mean is that understanding a spoken sentence is closer than one thinks to 
what is ordinarily called understanding a musical theme. Why is just this the pattern of variation 
6. Cf. Garry L. Hagberg, “A Confluence of Modernisms: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigation and 
Henry James’s Literary Language”; David Schalkwyk, “Wittgenstein and the Art of Defamiliarization”, Élise 
Marrou, “‘We Should be Seeing Life Itself ’ : Back to the Rough Ground of the Stage” and David Macarthur, 
“Art” – all in A. Matar (ed.), Understanding Wittgenstein, Understanding Modernism, N.Y.: Bloomsbury, 
2017.
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in intensity and tempo? One would like to say: Because I know what it all means. But what does it 
mean? I’d not be able to say. As an ‘explanation’, I could compare it with something else which has 
the same rhythm (I mean the same pattern). (One says, Don’t you see, this is as if a conclusion were 
being drawn or This is, as it were, a parenthesis, and so on. How does one justify such comparisons? 
– There are very different kinds of justification here.) […]
We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which 
says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than 
one musical theme can be replaced by another.) / In the one case the thought in the sentence 
is something common to different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only 
by these words in these positions. (Understanding a poem.) / Then has «understanding» two 
different meanings here? – I would rather say that these kinds of use of «understanding» make 
up its meaning, make up my concept of understanding. / For I want to apply the word «under-
standing» to all this.
But in the second case, how can one explain the expression, communicate what one under-
stands? Ask yourself: How does one lead someone to understand a poem or a theme? The an-
swer to this tells us how one explains the sense here. (PI 527-533)
All these reflections demonstrate the grammar of the new philosophical époque. They 
betray the uneasiness Wittgenstein felt upon realizing the necessary but also impossible con-
sequences of the Linguistic Turn for philosophy. Whereas the Turn was practiced so well 
– celebrated – by modernist artists, a thorough and honest philosopher like Wittgenstein 
could not but admit the philosophical tension existing between the Turn’s basic insight – the 
primacy of language in any investigation into essence – and the philosophical responsibility 
towards logos, thought, argumentation. Taking the Linguistic Turn seriously involves real-
izing – «against» Frege and Russell – that language is not an artificial «front» which gains its 
meaning from a deeper, more genuine «pure thought»; any appeal to thought as detached 
from the language which carries it betrays a retreat to the traditional misconception of lan-
guage as based essentially on passive representation of an external realm. Coming to terms 
with the Turn means realizing the interdependence between the two indispensable kinds of 
«understanding» – prosaic and poetical, logical and musical. But how is it possible to offer 
grammatical «explanations» which do not transgress the realm of language in its richness? 
How, on the other hand, are logos or Thought preserved when we focus our gaze in the sen-
tence? How does the «new subject» «take the place» of what Plato and Berkeley did? And, 
since Wittgenstein himself admits that philosophy «cannot» be written as a form of poetic 
composition, could he at all do «what he would like to be able to do»?
Obviously, a response to these questions cannot be given by concentrating on one kind 
of explanation – the conceptual one – and laying aside the other (the «poetical»). Both senses 
of «understanding» are necessary in order to convey philosophical insights, and none is mar-
ginal, secondary or inferior in relation to the other. And it is crucial to see that both models 
of «explanation» apply to «every» sentence, differences being only in degree or in context: 
Wittgenstein rightly speaks in general of «understanding a sentence in language». No sen-
tences can be cut off from their «tempo» and «tone», and hence adopting the Linguistic Turn 
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entails treating the content of «every» sentence as partly embedded «in» the sentence, i.e., as 
untranslatable in full into a logical, ordered and allegedly «clear» conceptual array. 
Wittgenstein’s reluctance from talking about philosophical explanation is worth a men-
tion now. In the above quotes, he uses this term either within scare-quotes or with an imme-
diate correction, replacing «explain the expression» by «communicate what one understands». 
Indeed, the whole sequence of paragraphs functions as a philosophical «description», in ac-
cordance with Wittgenstein’s proclaimed decision to offer «description alone» and «do away 
with all “explanation”» in philosophy (PI 109). Rather than premises and conclusion, we are 
offered a forceful analogy on our way towards grasping the idea of language’s autonomy. We 
are «shown» the connection between linguistic and musical content and «are reminded of» 
music’s autonomy. But in order to see what is shown to us, a particular aesthetic sensitivity 
is needed:
We say that someone has the eye of a painter or the ear of a musician, but anyone lacking these 
qualities hardly suffers from a kind of blindness or deafness. / We say that someone doesn’t have 
a musical ear, and aspect-blindness is (in a way) comparable to this inability to hear.7
If we lacked this kind of sensitivity, we would simply miss the point and fail to un-
derstand what was communicated to us. The shift from a linear explanation to multi-focal 
descriptions is radical; it is not only a shift in methodology, structure and philosophical lan-
guage, but also in the sort of skill required in order to exercise them. It is for this reason that 
we get innumerable comparisons between what the philosopher is trying to do and what an 
artist does; or between philosophical and aesthetic sensitivities. This idea is familiar enough 
from all of Wittgenstein’s later writings, but it is developed especially in his Lectures on Aes-
thetics from 1938. Let me quote at some length from these important lectures, so we can 
develop the musical ear needed for the point I wish to make later:
One asks such a question as ‘what does this remind me of?’  or one says of a piece of music: ‘This 
is like some sentence, but what sentence is this like?’ Various things are suggested; one thing, as 
you say, clicks. What does it mean, it ‘clicks’? Does it do anything you can compare to the noise 
of a click? Is there the ringing of a bell, or something comparable? (LA, III, 1, p. 19)
There is a ‘Why?’ to aesthetic discomfort not a ‘cause’ to it. (II 19, p. 14)
I very often draw your attention to certain differences, e.g. in these classes I tried to show you 
that Infinity is not so mysterious as it looks. What I’m doing is also persuasion. If someone 
says: «There is not a difference», and I say: «there is a difference» I am persuading, I am saying 
«I don’t want you to look at it like that.» Suppose I wished to show how very misleading the 
expressions of Cantor are. You ask: «What do you mean, it is misleading? Where does it lead you 
to?» […] «I am in a sense making propaganda for one style of thinking as opposed to another. 
7. Quoted in R., Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Duty of Genius, London, Vintage Books, 1990, 538.
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I am honestly disgusted with the other… (Much of what we are doing is a question of changing 
the style of thinking.) (III, 35, 37, 41, p. 27f.)
This last quote indicates that the sensitivity Wittgenstein appeals to is needed for con-
veying «any» philosophical content and is not at all restricted to aesthetics. Think for example 
of his appeal to our imagination in his discussion of rule-following, regarding the minute 
differences in cases of «being guided», in PI 172: when your eyes are bandaged, when you are 
unwilling to go, when you’re dancing, etc. A sensitivity to something that is very delicate and 
evasive is needed here. 
The last part of Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Aesthetics focuses almost entirely on the no-
tion of gesture and the intricacy in appealing to it for conveying an intention, description or 
judgment. For «gestures no less than words are intertwined in a net of multifarious relation-
ships» (RFM VI 48, p. 352). Wittgenstein has in mind something similar to his frustration 
about doing philosophy as poetry when he exclaims: «How curious: we should like to explain 
our understanding of gesture by means of translation into words, and the understanding of 
words by translating them into a gesture. (Thus we are tossed to and fro when we try to find 
out where understanding properly resides.)» (Z 227)
The appeal to gesture – especially in this vein – is typical of modernism as well. It is 
central especially for Benjamin and Brecht, who also acknowledge its complexity. For all 
three thinkers, it forms part of the rejection of representation, or better, a «meta-rejection». 
As Greenberg notes, the fact that modernist painting has abandoned the representation of re-
cognizable objects is dependent upon its rejection, in principle, of «the representation of the 
kind of space that recognizable, three-dimensional objects can inhabit».8 It is the change in 
«the kind of space» that makes the appeal to showing, to gesture, both indispensable and un-
stable. But such a deep change entails the instability of any appeal to «recognizable objects» 
as we ordinarily take them for granted in «the kind of space» that is recognizable. It is indeed 
what Schalkwyk referred to by talking of the «uncanniness of language as home».
I find this analysis totally convincing. I am persuaded by it. I am aware, of course, of 
the bitter disagreements among Wittgenstein’s scholars regarding his notion of the ordinary. 
Reading the later Wittgenstein alongside modernist writers made me see the force in Cavell’s 
interpretive approach, which takes the ordinary to be a goal rather than something that is 
already given. According to Cavell, we have to struggle – to engage in a quest – in order to 
reach it. Although Wittgenstein declared already in the Tractatus that «our language is in 
order as it is» (T 5.5563), it doesn’t mean that we understand «our language» without reflec-
tion. The commonsensical realist assumption underlying our everyday understanding and 
description is exposed, indeed in «both» stages of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, as suspicious 
and dogmatic. It resonates the traditional way of seeing the world that Wittgenstein – as any 
other modernist – wished to overcome. It is hence not at all accidental that Wittgenstein 
chose Plato and Berkeley as the philosophical links preceding his «new subject»: all three 
8. C. Greenberg, “Modernist..”, op. cit., 6.
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philosophers insist, albeit in radically different ways, on the importance of the distinction 
between reality and appearance. The grammatical appeal to aesthetic elucidations and the 
admission of an inherent, perennial philosophical failure marks the dramatic «kink» in the 
history of philosophy, in Wittgenstein’s words.  
Third Encounter
I believe that this approach offers a convincing critique of and an alternative to traditional 
metaphysics and its correlating philosophy of language. I take very seriously Wittgenstein’s 
determination to eschew dogmatism, and I believe that realism – the «kind of space» we 
take for granted in «common use» – reflects a deeply entrenched dogma. Now, an impor-
tant reason for this preference of mine (and I believe of Wittgenstein as well) is its political 
aspect. Alienation (estrangement, Verfremdungseffekt), a device that offers a de-familiarized, 
even uncanny alternative to how people are used to think, see and talk, is not only a famous 
Brechtian dramatic instrument but a hallmark of modernism in general: in Joyce’s hyperbolic 
language, Kafka’s parables, Artaud’s theatre of cruelty, Picasso’s cubism and Schoenberg’s 
twelve-tone technique, etc. At least for some of its proponents, the rejection of the ordinary 
way of looking at the ordinary involved political motivations.
During the 1930s, a heated debate took place in Germany among several Marxist artists 
and theoreticians. In exile before the war, Bloch, Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno po-
lemicized against each other over the nature and the political significance of expressionism, 
formalism and other modernist literary forms. Some of these texts were translated and pub-
lished in 1977 in a volume entitled Aesthetics and Politics. I’m mentioning this volume now 
because its main thread touches precisely upon the issue which concerns me in my third 
encounter with the Wittgenstein-modernism connection.
Large parts of that debate revolve around Lukács’ defense of realism (e.g. in the works 
of Gorky, Mann and Rolland) as contributing to the struggle of the working masses, and 
around his attack on avant-gardist writing (like Joyce’s) which – according to Lukács – has 
nothing liberating or edifying about it, despite its alleged progressiveness. Lukács’ conservat-
ism notwithstanding, his articulation of the tension that pervades avant-gardism, in relation 
to its liberating force, has been made a central focus of aesthetic controversy on the left ever 
since. Perry Anderson, who introduces some of the essays in Aesthetics and Politics, remarks 
about it that «the contradiction between “high” and “low” genres – the one subjectively pro-
gressive and objectively elitist, the other objectively popular and subjectively regressive – has 
never been durably overcome, despite a complex, crippled dialectic between the two».9 My 
present hesitation deals with this tension as it pertains to Wittgenstein’s modernism; but I’ ll 
start with Brecht.
Although he naturally criticizes Lukács’ conclusions, Brecht seems at first to concur 
with his basic sentiment towards realism: 
9. Anderson in E. Bloch, et al., Aesthetics and..., op. cit., 66.
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It is obvious that one must turn to the people, and now more necessary than ever to speak their 
language. Thus the terms popular art and realism become natural allies. It is in the interest of 
the people, of the broad working masses, to receive a faithful image of life from literature, and 
faithful images of life are actually of service only to the people, the broad working masses, and 
must therefore be absolutely comprehensible and profitable to them – in other words, popular.10
However, in what sounds to my sensitive ear as a very Wittgensteinian remark, he con-
tinues by noting that realism is not necessarily what we ordinarily think it is. «For time flows 
on... Methods become exhausted; stimuli no longer work. New problems appear and demand 
new methods. Reality changes; in order to represent it, modes of representation must also 
change (82)». Brecht’s conclusion is that for art to be of service to the people, it must reject 
what is customarily taken too much for granted, but is eventually deceitful: our everyday 
concepts. These 
must first be thoroughly cleansed before propositions are constructed in which they are emplo-
yed and merged. It would be a mistake to think that these concepts are completely transparent, 
without history, uncompromised or unequivocal. («We all know what they mean – don’t let’s 
split hairs).11
These concepts – those that come out of «ordinary use» – get their meaning and jus-
tification from the suppressed ideology of the ruling classes. Thus, for example, we find in 
them a remarkable unity «between tormenters and tormented, exploiters and exploited, de-
ceivers and deceived». The concept of realism should be reexamined according to this in-
sight. For «realistic», as Brecht would like to use this term, does not mean faithful to what we 
are used to see, but rather «unmasking the prevailing view of things as the view of those who 
are in power… making possible the concrete, and making possible abstraction from it.» And 
for achieving this, «we shall not bind the artist to too rigidly defined modes of narrative». On 
the contrary. Brecht knows that we endow art with the power to transform people; it could 
not do so if it was simply a non-reflective reflection of what they already know.
Now we can go back to Wittgenstein. I think that when Wittgenstein expresses the wish 
to be read slowly, he wants – among other things – to warn us against reading too simplist-
ically his declaration about bringing «words back from their metaphysical to their everyday 
use» (PI 116). If indeed, as I’ve claimed in my Cavellian «second station», his objection to lin-
ear argumentation has to do with his appeal to aesthetic sensitivity, then his «new subject» may 
certainly be read as aiming at «unmasking the prevailing view» in the political sense of these 
words. And indeed, several of his interpreters went as far as presenting Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophical method as Marxist «par excellence». My reluctance from fully adopting such 
an approach has to do with the question of the politically liberating power of modernism. 
10. Brecht in E. Bloch, et al., Aesthetics and..., op. cit., 80.
11. Brecht in E. Bloch, et al., Aesthetics and..., op. cit., 80.
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In «Modernism and Gender», Marianne Dekoven analyses the complex relations between 
the modernist and the feminist movements. She argues that, in light of the rise of women power 
during the same period of time, modernist writers were particularly preoccupied with gender 
issues, and that quite often this preoccupation «resulted in the combination of misogyny and 
triumphal masculinism that many critics see as central, defining features of modernist work 
by men».12 These features include the advocacy – in writing, architecture, painting and sculp-
ture – of firm, rigid, dry, terse and clean forms, against the soft and messy femininity of the 
Victorian era. When I thought of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as modernist, that was the kind of 
modernism I had in the back of my mind. But modernism’s famous ambivalence is expressed 
also with regards to this issue. If we focus on modernist writing, in particular, we see that it 
excelled in reflective doubts, plurality of voices, the dismantling of a hegemonic gaze and of the 
controlling authorial voice – in short, in the introduction, indeed the celebration, of what may 
be identified as feminine. A parallel duality imbues contemporary discussions of the colonial 
and post-colonial traits of modernism. On the one hand, post-colonial writers uncover the 
problematic treatment by modernist artists and writers of the «primitive» and the centrality of 
the white, «rational» European man – Frazer’s Golden Bough is an important example in our 
context; on the other, they point at the beginnings of an acceptance of the Other as bearing a 
legitimate viewpoint, as it is expressed, perhaps, at least partly, in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness 
and of course in Wittgenstein’s poignant remarks on Frazer.
I have argued above that the modernism of the Tractatus retained at least some logo-
centric dogmas. And so it is with Frazer. The later Wittgenstein could read the prejudice in 
Frazer’s descriptions; he exposed Frazer as a paradigmatic logocentric writer, whose «narrow 
spiritual life» led to his inability «to conceive of a life different from that of the England of this 
time!» (PO 125). Wittgenstein’s «musical ear» was sensitive enough to hear that, to bring to 
light the deceptiveness of the dogmas which hid beyond Frazer’s «ordinary». As he remarks 
in his Lectures on Aesthetics, an attention to «what we call a culture of a period» is needed 
here (I 25, p. 8). 
My problem is that this sensitivity itself relies on the perspective of a «qualified» judge, 
whose aesthetic sensitivities are developed enough for overcoming the treacherous «ordin-
ary». Thus, a circle of confidants is formed, such that only those belonging to this circle 
know when something «clicks». Alongside the traditional «domination by reason», we get 
a new «domination by aesthetic sensitivity» of those who have the needed ear and eye for 
identifying «the right tempo» and «the right tone». Wittgenstein is quite aware of this, and he 
explicitly mentions those people «who can’t express themselves properly» and their unsoph-
isticated use of words.
In what we call the Arts a person who has judgement develops… We distinguish between a 
person who knows what he is talking about and a person who doesn’t… In music this is more 
pronounced... We use the phrase ‘A man is musical’  not so as to call a man musical if he says 
12. M., Decoven, “Modernism and Gender”, in M. Levenson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Modern-
ism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 174.
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‘Ah!’  when a piece of music is played, any more than we call a dog musical if it wags its tail when 
music is played. (LA I 17 p. 6)
Wittgenstein even acknowledges the linkage between the aesthetic sensitivity and class, 
and immediately tries to broaden the circle of «confidants»: 
There are lots of people, well-offish, who have been to good schools, who can afford to travel 
about and see the Louvre, etc., and who know a lot about and can talk fluently about dozens of 
painters. There is another person who has seen very few paintings, but who looks intensely at 
one or two paintings which make a profound impression on him. Another person who is broad, 
neither deep nor wide. Another person who is very narrow, concentrated and circumscribed. 
Are these different kinds of appreciation? They may all be called ‘appreciation’. (LA I, 30, p.9)
However, once aesthetic sensitivities are developed within a circle of confidants who 
were exposed to «high», avant-gardist art within the «culture of the period», once such a 
sensitivity becomes a prerequisite for overcoming the ordinary as we ordinarily see it, we 
reach the uncomfortable result that the liberating perspective is retained almost exclusively 
by those whose everyday existence is far from that of the «working masses». This is true of 
avant-gardism as it is true of Wittgenstein. 
I was writing this paper in my beloved reading room at the British Library. And while 
every moment I spent there was delightful, I could not but notice the overwhelming white-
ness of the researchers; the justified assumption, when I see a black person in the corridor, 
that he or she are most likely employees of the Library (and not necessarily librarians). That 
reading room represents, for me, the kind of community of aesthetically sensitive writers 
which challenges the radicalism of modernism. For it is, precisely as Anderson put it, sub-
jectively progressive but objectively elitist. Cavell, in The Claim of Reason, seems to be aware 
of this uncomfortable situation:
The epistemological problem of society is not to discover new facts about it; the facts… are 
there to be had. The problem is for me to discover my position with respect to these facts – 
how I know with whom I am in community, and to whom and to what I am in fact obedient… 
We obey the logic of conspiracy, though we believe this to be true only of others… Rousseau’s 
discovery is… of a new me of ignorance. Marx and Freud will call this ignorance unconscious, 
the former of our social present, the latter of our private pasts; but these will prove not to be so 
different. (Both speak of this ignorance as the result of repression).13
But where does Cavell take the newly liberated awareness of our being – not only polit-
ically, but also epistemologically – part of a community, which we recognize as ours? I must 
admit that this is where I got lost. 
13. S., Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, 25f.
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For me, at any rate, this comment only reinforces the tension I address here. And what I 
find particularly inspiring in post-modernist discourse is its honesty and openness regarding 
the problem pointed at. True, post-modernism bred a lot of relativistic jargons and positions 
that I cannot find at all appealing. I am still guided by the modernist wish to capture the 
world «sub specie aeterni» and share Wittgenstein’s belief that there is a way of doing this 
«other than the work of the artist»; indeed, even that «thought has such a way» (CV 5). How-
ever, if it does have such a way, it cannot be monopolized. Thought cannot «obey the logic of 
conspiracy» and be taken over by a circle of privileged confidants. If it «flies above the world» 
and observes it «from above, in flight», what it observes is an irreducible array of judgements, 
which are founded on numerous and conflicting experiences of the «ordinary» and condone 
this notion with various meanings. What we need, therefore, is a way of bringing together 
the required cultivated aesthetic sensibility, the undoing of the hermetic gaze and the intro-
duction of a «weak draughtsman» instead, and most importantly, the ability to transcend 
one’s deceitful «ordinary» in a way that opens itself to the differences «between tormenters 
and tormented, exploiters and exploited, deceivers and deceived». What we need, perhaps, is 
Brecht’s anti-realist version of «realism», namely, what is 
intelligible to the broad masses, adopting and enriching their forms of expression / assuming 
their standpoint, confirming and correcting it / representing the most progressive section of the 
people so that it can assume leadership, and therefore intelligible to other sections of the people 
as well / relating to traditions and developing them / communicating to that portion of the peo-
ple which strives for leadership the achievements of the section that at present rules the nation.14
As strange as this may sound, perhaps this vision is not that far, after all, from Wittgen-
stein’s «new subject». But both modernist visions – Brecht’s as well as Wittgenstein’s – are 
merely programmatic; that’s their main problem. 
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